Abstract-This paper considers the problem of filter design with secrecy constraints, where two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, over multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian channels. In particular, we consider the design of transmit and receive filters that minimize the mean-squared error (MSE) between the legitimate parties subject to a certain eavesdropper MSE level, in the situation where the eavesdropper MIMO channel is a degraded version of the main MIMO channel. We characterize the form of the optimal receive filters as well as the form of optimal transmit filter in different scenarios. We also put forth an iterative algorithm to obtain the optimal values of the transmit and receive filters. Finally, we present a set of numerical results that illustrate the conclusions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issues of privacy and security in wireless communication networks have taken on an increasingly important role as these networks continue to flourish worldwide. Traditionally, security is viewed as an independent feature with little or no relation to the remaining data communication tasks and, therefore, state-of-the-art cryptographic algorithms are insensitive to the physical nature of the wireless medium.
However, there has been more recently a renewed interest on information-theoretic security -widely accepted as the strictest notion of security -which calls for the use of physicallayer techniques exploiting the inherent randomness of the communications medium to guarantee both reliable and secure communication.
The basis of information-theoretic security, which builds upon Shannon's notion of perfect secrecy [1] , was laid by Wyner [2] and by Csiszár and Körner [3] who proved in seminal papers that there exist channel codes guaranteeing both robustness to transmission errors and a certain degree of data confidentiality. In particular, Wyner considered the wiretap channel where the eavesdropper observes degraded versions of the main channel messages over the wiretap channel and characterized the rate-equivocation region of the wiretap channel and its secrecy capacity. Ever since, the computation of the secrecy capacity of a range of communications channels has been an important research topic (e.g., see [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] ). This paper considers secure communications from the estimation-theoretic view-point. We consider the problem of filter design with secrecy constraints in the classical wiretap scenario consisting of two legitimate parties that communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper, where the objective is to dimension transmit and receive filters that minimize the meansquared error (MSE) between the legitimate parties whilst guaranteeing a certain eavesdropper MSE level. In particular, we shall extend recent results [8] on filter design with secrecy constraints from degraded parallel wiretap Gaussian channels to degraded multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian wiretap channels. Interestingly, this class of problems represents a natural generalization of filter design for point-to-point communications systems which has been considered in the past by several authors (e.g. [9] , [10] ). Some work on the topic of filter design in the wiretap channel scenario has also recently been presented in [11] . This paper is structured as follows: Section II defines the problem. Sections III and IV consider the design of the receive and transmit filters. Section V puts forth an iterative algorithm to compute the elements of the optimal transmit filter, and hence the receive filters. Section VI discusses the regions of validity of the operational regimes under consideration. Section VII shows various numerical results to illustrate the impact of the filter designs on both the reliability and security criteria and draws the main conclusions of this work.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT We consider a communications scenario where a legitimate user, say Alice, communicates with another legitimate user, say Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve (see Figure  1 ).
Bob and Eve observe, each one, the output of the main and the eavesdropper MIMO channels respectively, given by:
where Y M and Y E are the n M and the n E -dimensional vectors of receive symbols, X is the l-dimensional vector of independent, zero-mean and unit-variance transmit symbols. N M and N E are n M and n E -dimensional complex Gaussian Bob's and Eve's estimate of the vector of input symbols are given by:
where the l × n M matrix H RM and the l × n E matrix H RE represent Bob's and Eve's receive filters, respectively. In this setting, we take as a performance metric the MSE between the estimate of the input vector and the true input vector given by:
The general objective is to design Alice's transmit filter and Bob's receive filter that solve the optimization problem:
(10) In turn, the MSEs corresponding to these receive filters are given by:
(12) where tr · denotes the trace operator.
IV. OPTIMAL TRANSMIT FILTER This section considers the design of the optimal transmit filter. This constitutes a complex optimization problem. In general, it follows from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions that the solution to the optimization problem falls into three different categories: (1) power constraint active and secrecy constraint inactive; (2) power and secrecy constraints active; (3) power constraint inactive and secrecy constraint active. Consequently, rather than solve completely the optimization problem, we will concentrate on the solutions in the regimes (1) and (3). We will also put forth conditions that depend solely on the system parameters (e.g. P avg , γ, H M , H E ) which identify the exact regime of operation. We note in passing that the general solution is only known, to the best of our knowledge, for the parallel degraded Gaussian wiretap channel [8] .
A. Power constraint active / secrecy constraint inactive
We now consider the scenario where the power constraint is active, whilst the secrecy constraint is inactive. This situation arises typically in a regime of low available power, due to the fact that the power, injected into the channel, is not enough to meet or violate the secrecy constraint.
Consequently, the solution follows by solving the optimization problem: min (14) To address this design problem, we shall use the fact that there exists an orthogonal matrix C that diagonalizes
The solution for this optimization problem can be found in, e.g., [8] or [9] .
Theorem 1:
The optimal transmit filter for the degraded multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian wiretap channel with no secrecy constraints is, without loss of generality, given by:
where
with λ such that
B. Power constraint inactive / secrecy constraint active
We now consider the scenario where the secrecy constraint is active and the power constraint is inactive. This is a situation that typically arises in a regime of high available power: in fact, the use of all the available power, in such regime, would immediately violate the secrecy constraint.
Consequently, the solution follows by solving the optimization problem: min
subject to the constraint
To address this design problem, we shall use the fact that there exists a non-singular matrix C that diagonalizes both
We assume that the set of ratios
Theorem 2: The optimal transmit filter for the degraded multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian wiretap channel with no power constraint is, without loss of generality, given by:
The linear minimum mean-squared error (LMMSE) is lmmse(x) = 1/(1+x).
Proof: Using the generalized eigenvalue decomposition in eq. (21) and (22), it is possible to show that the original optimization problem is equivalent to the optimization problem: miñ
subject to the constraint:
whereH T = C −1 H T . Consider now any matrixH TH † T that respects the secrecy constraint. It is possible to show, via considerable algebraic manipulation, that using the matrix Diag(H TH † T ) (which is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements correspond to the diagonal elements ofH TH † T ) rather 3 Note that σ * i = +∞ means that σ * i → +∞ is asymptotically optimal. Obviously, this part of the solution will not belong to region of validity of this regime, as discussed in section VI.
thanH TH † T will decrease the value of the objective function without violating the constraint. Consequently, we can take, without loss of generality, the optimal matrixH TH † T to be diagonal, i.e.,H TH † , σ 2 , . . . , σ l ) , and the optimal matrix
We can also take without loss of generality the optimal matrix
the main channel and the eavesdropper channel MSEs reduce to
−1 , respectively. We shall now determine the optimal elements of the matrix Σ = diag(σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ l ) . Interestingly, the one-to-one mapping σ i = (1 + λ E i σ i ) −1 transforms the (apparently nonconvex) optimization problem:
subject to
and σ i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , l into a standard convex optimization problem:
and 0 ≤ σ i ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , l. 4 The optimal solution follows immediately from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions [14] .
Consequently, the solution is given by
immediately by reversing the one-to-one mapping.
V. ALGORITHM In this section, we put forth an algorithm capable of efficiently determining the elements of the optimal transmit filter. In particular, we concentrate solely on the regime where the power constraint is inactive whilst the secrecy constraint is active, because a computational procedure applicable to the other regime appears in [9] . The generalized eigenvalue decomposition can be computed using standard procedures [13] . In turn, the elements σ i * , i = 1, . . . , l of the optimal transmit filter can be computed using the algorithm shown in Table 1 . This algorithm, which converges in a maximum of l iterations, is based on the solution embodied in Theorem 2. The receive filters in (9) and (10) follow trivially from knowledge of the channel matrices and the transmit filter.
VI. OPERATIONAL REGIMES REGIONS
We have presented the solution to the optimization problem in two operational regimes: (i) when the power constraint is active while the secrecy constraint is inactive; and (ii) when the power constraint is inactive while the secrecy constraint is active. We now establish conditions, as function of the system parameters, that identify the exact regions for the regimes of operation. Consider the first operational regime (i). It is immediate to show that this regime is valid if:
where σ * i follows the solution embodied in Theorem 1, or:
with n act being the number of active channels. The value n act is obtained from the algorithm present in [9] . Consider now the regime (ii). It is also immediate to show that this regime is valid if:
where σ * i follows the solution embodied in Theorem 2, or:
with C being the matrix that diagonalizes both channels, n act the number of active channels and n inact the number of inactive channels. We can obtain n act and n inact from the algorithm depicted in Table 1 . Note that (36) and (37) can be used to determine a maximum value for the secrecy constraint, γ maxreg1 , below which we operate under regime (i), or equivalently, a maximum value for the power constraint, P avgmax , below which we operate under the same regime. Likewise, (38) and (39) can be used to determine a minimum value for the secrecy constraint, γ minreg3 , above which we operate under regime (ii), or equivalently, a minimum value for the power constraint, P avgmin , above which we operate in the same regime. This is further explored in the next section.
VII. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
We shall now present a set of numerical results to provide further insight into the problem of filter design with secrecy constraints. We consider a 2 × 2 MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel where the main and the eavesdropper channel matrices are, respectively, given by:
Note that this represents a degraded scenario because Figure 2 illustrates the optimal values of the elements of the transmit filter, σ * i , i = 1, 2 vs. the secrecy constraint γ, with P avg = 1. This figure clearly depicts the three regimes of operation. It is interesting to note that, in the first operational regime, the optimal σ * i are constant because the solution is independent from the value of the secrecy constraint γ. In the second regime, the optimal σ * i will depend on γ, and the values are such that both the secrecy and the power constraint are met with equality. In the third regime, where the power constraint is not active, the optimal σ * i also depend on γ. In fact, as the secrecy constraint increases, the values σ * i decrease, and hence the injected power into de channel decreases too, otherwise one would violate the secrecy constraint. Note also that we identify the secrecy constraint threshold values γ maxreg1 and γ minreg3 , below and above which, one operates in the first and third regimes, respectively. Figure 3 shows the values of the MSEs in the main and in the eavesdropper channels and the injected power into the channels vs. the secrecy constraint, with P avg = 1. The three operational regimes are, once more, very evident. Below γ maxreg1 ,the optimal solution corresponds to the minimum mean squared error in the main channel that is possible to obtain given the available power only. We can verify that the available power is not sufficient to meet or violate the secrecy constraint, in this region. In-between γ maxreg1 and γ minreg3 , the optimal solution (which has not been derived in this paper Table 1 Input :
• Number of sub-channels l; set of values λ M i , i = 1, . . . , l; set of values λ E i , i = 1, . . . , l; secrecy constraint γ.
Output:
• Set of optimal values σ i * , i = 1, . . . , l; number of finite active sub-channels n act (0 < σ i * < +∞); number of inactive sub-channels n inact (σ i * = 0).
• Set σ n * = 0; set n = n − 1; set n inact = n inact + 1; go to step 2.
• Set n act = n;
The number of finite active sub-channels (where 0 < σ n * < +∞) is n act , the number of inactive sub-channels (where σ i * = 0) is n inact .
and was obtained through numerical methods) minimizes the MSE in the main channel while meeting the power and the secrecy constraint with equality. Above γ minreg3 , the optimal solution corresponds to the minimum mean squared error in the main channel, that is possible to obtain, given the secrecy constraint only. It is also important to verify that, since we are considering the degraded case, the mean squared error in the main channel will always be lower than the one in the eavesdropper channel. It is also of interest to analyze the mutual information between the input vector and the eavesdropper output vector, achieved by our design. Figure 4 depicts the mutual information between the input X and the eavesdropper output Y E vs. the available power, assuming that the input is Gaussian and considering four different scenarios: (1) the optimal transmit filter ; (2) the transmit filter H T that minimizes the mean squared error in the main channel, but does not take in account any secrecy constraint; (3) the transmit filter H T being a multiple of the identity matrix, and the tr H T H † T equal to the power used by the optimal transmit filter; and (4) the transmit filter H T being a multiple of the identity matrix, and tr H T H † T = P avg . It is very interesting to verify that, even without directly minimizing the mutual information in the eavesdropper channel, which corresponds to the informationtheoretic security criteria par excellence, our optimal solution results in the lowest mutual information of these four cases. In particular, by imposing a minimum threshold on the MSE in the eavesdropper channel one will, not only impair the eavesdropper performance but also limit the amount of information that is leaked.
To conclude, we note that the design of filters that minimize the MSE between the legitimate parties whilst guaranteeing a minimum MSE at the eavesdropper, subject to a power constraint, appears to be a viable option to provide reliability and a certain additional degree of security. In particular, the design have been shown to limit the amount of mutual information leaked to the eavesdropper, in comparison to other designs. To the best of our knowledge, the general solution to the optimization problem is not known. 
